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SECONDARY LIABILITY AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT LAW

JacquelineD. Lipton*

ABSTRACT

The digital age brought many challenges for copyright law. While
offering enticing new formats for the production and dissemination of
copyright content, it also raised the specter of large scale digital piracy.
Since the end of the 20th century, content industries have reeled to keep
up with technological developments that offer significant promise as
well as threats of large scale piracy. There has always been some
tension between promoting innovation in content creation and promoting
innovation in technologies that enable the enjoyment of copyright works,
such as photocopiers, audio tape recorders, video tape recorders, and
peer-to-peer file sharing systems. The manufacturers and distributors of
these technologies have had to tread a fine line in their marketing and
distribution efforts to avoid liability for secondary copyright
infringement based on direct infringements by their customers. To this
list of technologies, we may now add Internet search engines and online
payment systems. This paper considers ways in which copyright law has
addressed the secondary liability question in an increasingly digital
marketplace. It suggests that the realities of this marketplace necessitate
a new look at broader policy issues underlying digital copyright law in
order to meaningfully address questions of secondary liability online.
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I. INTRODUCTION

[W]e live in a quicksilver technological environment with
courts ill-suited to fix the flow of internet innovation .... The

introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old
markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose
works are sold through well-established distribution
mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that time and market
forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests,
whether the new technology be a player piano, a copier, a tape
recorder, a video recorder, a personal computer, a karaoke
machine, or an MP3 player. Thus, it is prudent for courts to
exercise caution before restructuring liability theories for the
purpose of addressing specific market abuses, despite their
apparent present magnitude.
-

MGM Studios Inc. v Grokster'

Digital copyright law has raised significant challenges for content
industries on a global scale. Digital technology offers new formats for
products and services of content-industries. Examples of such formats
include CDs, DVDs, and MP3s. Some of these, such as CDs and DVDs,
can be marketed through traditional brick and mortar stores. However,
digital formats also allow for online distribution of copyrighted content.
This, in turn, enables new and more flexible business models; for
example, customers can now buy individual copyrighted songs rather
than entire albums, and these songs can be downloaded to home
computers and hand-held devices such as iPods.
These developments come with a distinct downside for content
holders: the new technologies enable digital copyright piracy on a scope
and scale never before possible. Technologies that make it cheap and
easy for content holders to market their wares globally and make
unlimited copies of works at the push of button also enable copyright

1. 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004); vacated, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 (2005).
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pirates to do the same thing. The risks for content holders are
exacerbated by the fact that the copyright infringers could potentially
reside anywhere in the world, thus raising jurisdictional problems.
Additionally, it is relatively easy to be anonymous online, so it may be
difficult for content holders to even find primary infringers, let alone
deal with the jurisdictional issues their activities may raise.
As a result, copyright holders have established a number of avenues
for clamping down on online infringements, some of which are based on
traditional copyright doctrine while others have required new legislation.
An example of the latter is found in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998 ("DMCA"),2 which addresses a variety of concerns of
online content industries. Some of the more contentious provisions of
the legislation are the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking
provisions.3 They are an attempt to use law to bolster the effect of
encryption technologies utilized by content industries to prevent
unauthorized access to, and use of, their works. As no encryption
technology can be 100% effective in this context, the legislation
prohibits attempts to circumvent such encryption technologies,4 and to
traffic in devices that circumvent such technologies.5
The DMCA also addresses concerns that Internet Service Providers
("ISPs") might be found liable for copyright infringements of their
customers. It sets out a new notice and takedown regime to provide a
safe harbor for ISPs that comply with notices sent by copyright holders
about online copyright infringements.6 ISPs have been concerned about
secondary liability questions relating to direct infringements by their
customers. Secondary liability has historically comprised two distinct
prongs in copyright law - contributory and vicarious liability.7 The
former doctrine, in fact, has been relatively broadly expanded due to the
2005 Supreme Court decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v Grokster.8
Because of practical difficulties inherent in proceeding against
multiple individual direct infringers online, copyright holders have
increasingly resorted to the DMCA's notice and takedown regime as
well as secondary liability doctrines to protect their works online. This
2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 1201(a)(l).
5. Id.§§ 1201(a)(2), 1201(b)(l).
6. Id. § 512(c).
7. See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(discussing tests for contributory and vicarious liability and how they might apply to Internet
service providers and bulletin board operators).
8. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005).
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effectively causes what I call a fragmentation of digital copyright law
online. By this, I mean that the laws that extend liability for copyright
infringement to secondary parties such as ISPs are shattering in a
number of different directions to respond to new technological
developments. Because digital developments arise very quickly, the law
is arguably fragmenting in many different directions extremely quickly.
It thus becomes very difficult for anyone to make sense of the secondary
liability doctrines under any clear and unified notion of copyright policy.
This paper queries whether the current fast-paced and fragmented
development of secondary liability doctrines is warranted or appropriate.
It suggests the alternative of focusing instead on addressing underlying
policies of copyright law in the digital age to arrive at an appropriate
balance of interests online. Without such a focus on more general policy
concerns, there is a risk of chilling innovation in online services such as
search engines and payment systems, and even peer-to-peer file sharing
services. With new models of production and distribution of works
developing online at an exponential rate, and significant changes in the
entities that create and distribute content,9 it is now important to revisit
underlying copyright policy for the digital age.
Now may be the time to scale back online copyright protection
rather than allowing for digital copyright law to make a million small
cracks in developing innovation spaces online. This fragmentation is
particularly significant if one considers that different countries are
adopting different approaches to secondary liability.
While the
American case law has forked out and arguably accepted three distinct
types of secondary liability in recent years,'0 other jurisdictions are at the
same time creating different and new forms of secondary liability."
These disparities between jurisdictions must be added to the secondary
liability fragmentation equation because of the global nature of the
digital marketplace. Plaintiffs increasingly have a choice of jurisdiction
in which to bring secondary infringement actions because of the global
nature of most online conduct. This means that the fragmentation
9. For example, consumers are now also producers and distributors of copyright works. See
generally Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Creative Destruction: Napster and the New Economics of Digital
Technology, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 263 (2002); Dan Hunter & Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-toAmateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 951 (2004).
10. See discussion infra Part HI.
11. See, e.g., Rebecca Giblin & Mark Davison, Kazaa Goes the Way of Grokster?
Authorisation [sic] of Copyright Infringement via Peer-to-Peer Networks in Australia, 17
AUSTRALIAN INTELL. PROP. J. 53 (2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1071443 (last visited October 31, 2008) (comparing the Australian
"authorization" test for secondary liability infringement online with American law).
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problem increases exponentially with more and more secondary liability
options developing in different jurisdictions. 12
Part II briefly surveys the kinds of secondary liability questions that
have arisen in recent years in the digital realm, and their respective
judicial resolutions to date. Part m advocates considering these
problems through a broader lens that examines the purposes of digital
copyright law more generally. Part V sets out conclusions and
suggestions for future developments in the area of digital copyright
policy generally, and the nature of secondary liability in the digital
context in particular.
II. SECONDARY LIABILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE

First, there were photocopies - enabling easy consumer duplication
of copyrighted books. 13 Then audio and video tape recorders came
along, enabling easy copying of protected music and video. 14 In none of
these cases were the copies particularly good, and in most cases they did
not endure particularly well on relevant media. Additionally, the copies
were bulky and physically difficult to distribute, even if a copyist was
minded to do so.
Enter the digital age. Digital files comprising electronic literature,
music, and movies can now freely move around the Internet from
business to individual, and from individual to individual. Consumers
become producers and distributors."
Copies can be made and
distributed almost instantaneously at the push of a button. Many
unauthorized copies might be chalked up to fair use, 16 or maybe "lawful
personal use."' 7 However, many, if not most, unauthorized uses and
distributions are unquestionably infringing.
Given the scope and scale of online copying and distribution, it is
not practical to expect copyright holders to proceed against every

12. Id.
13. See discussion inMARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 484-86 (4th
ed. 2005) (summarizing case law relating to copyright infringement through photocopying).
14.

WILLIAM CORNISH

&

DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

PATENTS,

COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS, 13.11 (5th ed. 2003) (noting the rise of copying
technologies including photocopiers, dual cassette tape recorders, and video cassette recorders).
15. See Ku, supranote 9; Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 9.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2007).
17 Jessica Litman, Lawful PersonalUse, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1895 (2007) (suggesting that some
personal uses may not in fact amount to copyright infringement because they are actually outside
the intended scope of copyright law altogether).
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individual who directly infringes. 18
Putting to one side cost,
jurisdictional concerns, and difficulties in even identifying wrongdoers
in a largely anonymous- online space, the idea of suing people who are
often your own customers potentially leads to very bad press. Copyright
owners have therefore turned to a strategy of attacking choke points in
the chain of online distribution on the basis of secondary liability for
users' direct infringements. These choke points include services that
provide general Internet connectivity (such as ISPs, bulletin board
operators, etc), 19 peer-to-peer file sharing capabilities, and more
recently 2° Internet search engines,2 1 and online payments systems.22
Legal problems began to arise when it became obvious that there
was a mismatch between existing secondary liability doctrines in
copyright law and the realities of the online marketplace. The accepted
forms of secondary liability for copyright infringement were
contributory liability and vicarious liability. Contributory liability was,
until 2005, defined as the accrual of liability where the defendant
induced, caused or materially contributed to the infringement by a third
party with knowledge of the infringing activity.23 Vicarious liability
arose in cases where a defendant had the right and ability to control a
third party's infringing activities and where the defendant also received a
direct financial benefit from the infringement.24
Neither of these tests fit the digital revolution particularly well
when applied to the first wave of secondary liability litigation involving
peer-to-peer file sharing services. Contributory liability tended to be
problematic when it came to establishing that a defendant file-sharing
service had the requisite knowledge of the infringing activities of its
customers. Vicarious liability was potentially difficult because it was
not often easy to prove a direct financial benefit in the hands of the
defendant file-sharing service provider that related to its customers'
direct infringements. Additionally, depending on the structure of an

18. Of course, copyright holders do also proceed against individual users. See, e.g., BMG
Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).
19. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
20. A&M Records v. Napster, 114 F. Supp 2.d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in partand rev'd
in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 913
(2005).
21. Perfect l0 v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).

22. Perfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
23. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d

Cir. 1971).
24. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
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online service, it was not always easy to prove the ability of the
defendant to monitor or control the infinging conduct.
Of course, we know that courts did ultimately find Napster, for
example, liable on both counts.25 With respect to contributory liability,
the Ninth Circuit held that Napster had both actual and constructive
knowledge of its users' infringing activities.2 6 The plaintiffs had given
Napster plenty of knowledge of the actual infringing files.27 Further, the
court held that even vicarious liability was made out because a sufficient
financial benefit related to the infringement occurred where the
availability of infringing material acted as a draw for Napster's
28 Additionally, Napster was found to have the ability to
customers. 28
supervise the infringing activities of its customers because it was able to
monitor the titles of files traded through its services,29 even though it did
not maintain copies of those files on its own servers.
This was somewhat of a departure from existing precedent, but it
was arguably reasonable, taking into account the move from real world
spaces - such as swap meets where bootleg music is traded3" - to the
online environment. In an online business model, the test of something
related to infringement being a draw for the defendant's customers may
be the closest analogy there is to charging rent in the real world to a
direct infringer who trades bootlegged music at a swap meet. 31 In any
event, the Napster court did find real world precedent for the proposition
that financial benefit may be made out where the availability of
infringing material in a physical venue acts as a draw for customers, and
thus enhances the profits the venue operator may make from charging
rents to vendors.32 Additionally, the ability for a secondary liability
defendant to use keyword searches to find infringing material is the best
online analog to asking a defendant to physically monitor conduct
occurring within its physical premises.

25. A&M Recording, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
26. Id. at 1020-22.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1023.
29. Id. at 1024.
30. See, e.g., Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 263 ("the defendants reap substantial financial benefits from admission fees,
concession stand sales and parking fees, all of which flow directly from customers who want to buy
the counterfeit recordings at bargain basement prices. The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged direct
financial benefit.").
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Then along came Grokster.13 Grokster technically had no actual or
constructive knowledge of any files shared over its peer-to-peer software
because it retained no central servers; thus, it argued - and convinced the
Ninth Circuit Court3 4 - that it could not be contributorily liable for
infringing activities of those who utilized its software. It also argued,
again successfully in the Ninth Circuit, that it could not be vicariously
liable because it had no effective ability to supervise the activities of the
infringers using its services. 3 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of the
United States found against Grokster on contributory liability grounds,
but in so doing, arguably created - or at least unearthed - a new form of
contributory liability that had not previously been recognized in
copyright law.36
This new form of secondary liability has come to be known as
inducement liability, and was described by the Supreme Court as
follows: "one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting
acts of infingement. 3 7 In Grokster, the Supreme Court, while not
definitively settling the question of whether the plaintiffs' secondary
liability claim had been made out, 38 suggested that there were three
factors that weighed in favor of such a finding. They were: (a) each
defendant showed itself as aiming to satisfy a known source of demand
for copyright infringing music; 39 (b) no defendant attempted to develop
any filtering tools to monitor or prevent copyright infringement; 40 and,
(c) several defendants made money by selling advertising space and
infringing music known to be a draw for custom and therefore also a
draw for advertisers.4 '
Effectively, the Grokster decision fragmented secondary liability
doctrine into new directions that have now enabled new actions to be
taken by copyright holders against other kinds of online service
providers such as search engines and payment services. Ironically, the

33. 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004); vacated, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 (2005).
34. 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004).
35. Id.at 1164-66.
36. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934-35 (2005).
37. Id.at 918.
38. Id. at 940 ("This evidence alone would not justify an inference of unlawful intent, but
viewed in the context of the entire record its import is clear.").
39. 1dat939.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 939-40.
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Grokster decision also failed to stem the tide of online file sharing
because new online file-sharing services would continue to attempt to
either skirt around the law in Grokster, or simply skirt around the spirit
of the law
by not being centralized or easily identified by a potential
42
plaintiff.
Recently, secondary liability suits have been brought against both
Internet search engines and online payment system providers. The
biggest plaintiff in recent years has been Perfect 10, a company that
markets photographs of nude or scantily clad women.43 Perfect 10 has
not, to date, been exceptionally successful in its litigation against Google
and Visa,"4 but it has been chipping away at the boundaries of secondary
copyright liability. While Perfect 10 failed against Visa in the Ninth
Circuit,4 5 it has been a little more successful against Google in the same
court. 4 6

In the Visa case, the Ninth Circuit found that the activities of the
payment system provider were too far removed from the actual
47
infringing activities on merchants' websites to constitute contributory
or vicarious liability, 48 even though Perfect 10 had allegedly notified the
payment system of the infringements.4 9 However, in the Google
litigation, the Ninth Circuit left the door open to secondary liability. The
court held that Google could be contributorily liable for copyright
infringement under what looks like a merged Grokster/pre-Grokster
42. See Rebecca Giblin, The Code/Law Collision (November 2007) (unpublished doctoral
thesis, Monash University, Melbourne Australia) (on file with the author).
43. See Ryan Rodenberg, Bryan Swatt, &Pamela Laucella, Perfect 10 v Visa, Mastercard,et
al: A Full Frontal Assault on Copyright Enforcement in Digital Media or a Slippery Slope
Diverted?, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 85 (2008).
44. Perfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
45. Id.
46. Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
47. Perfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The credit card companies cannot
be said to materially contribute to the infringement in this case because they have no direct
connection to that infiingement. Here, the infringement rests on the reproduction, alteration, display
and distribution of Perfect 10's images over the Internet. Perfect 10 has not alleged that any
infringing material passes over Defendants' payment networks or through their payment processing
systems, or that Defendants' systems are used to alter or display the infringing images.").
48. Id. at 803-04 ("[The vicarious liability] argument fails. The Napster program's
involvement with-and hence its "policing" power over--the infringement was much more intimate
and directly intertwined with it than Defendants' payment systems are. Napster provided users with
the tools to enable the easy reproduction and distribution of the actual infringing content and to
readily search out and identify infringing material.").
49. Id. at 793 ("Terfect 10 alleges that it sent Defendants repeated notices specifically
identifying infringing websites and informing Defendants that some of their consumers use their
payment cards to purchase infringing images. Defendants admit receiving some of these notices, but
they took no action in response to the notices after receiving them.").
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test. 50 The Ninth Circuit in Google held that Google could be liable for

contributory infringement if it: (a) had knowledge that infringing images
were available using its search engine; (b) could take simple measures to
prevent further damage to the copyrighted works; and, (c) failed to take
such steps. 5' It remanded the case to the district court for further
consideration of these issues, as well as consideration of whether Google
could avail itself of the safe harbor under § 512 of the Copyright Act.
The answer to both questions depends to a significant extent on the
adequacy of any notices sent to Google by Perfect 10.52
The Google decision may be regarded as a further fragmentation of
secondary liability principles online. As Google obviously did not
induce copyright infringement in the way that, say, Grokster did, the
application of the straight Grokster inducement test did not really work
for the plaintiffs. At the same time, Google's activities probably did not
neatly satisfy the pre-Grokster heads of secondary liability. Google did
not materially contribute to infringement with knowledge, and it did not
obtain direct financial benefit from infringement that it had the right and
duty to control.53 However, it may have satisfied the new Ninth Circuit
test apparently tailored just for it. This test would impose liability on the
basis of knowledge of infringement and failure to take reasonable steps
to prevent further infringement.5 4
Thus, all a plaintiff would have to prove is that the defendant had
been notified of infringement and then the duty would be on the
defendant to remedy the situation. Failure to do so would result in
contributory liability infringement. In many ways, this test now parallels
the safe harbor under § 512 of the DMCA. 55 Arguably, the burdens of
proof would be different under § 512 as compared with this new
contributory liability test. Presumably, under § 512 the burden is on the
defendant to establish the safe harbor, while under the contributory
liability test, the burden is presumably at least initially on the plaintiff to
establish that the defendant had sufficient knowledge of infringing
activities and failed to counteract them. Of course, the plaintiff could

50.

Id. at 801 (noting that the court in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 487 F 3d 701, 729 (9th Cir.

2007) did not bifurcate its analysis of the standard contributory liability test from the Groksterinspired inducement test for contributory liability).
51.

Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701,729(9th Cir. 2007).

52. Id. ("The district court did not resolve the factual disputes over the adequacy of Perfect
10's notices to Google and Google's responses to these notices.").
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 730.
Id. at 729.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
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probably satisfy the knowledge requirement fairly easily by providing
notice to the defendant of the alleged infringements.
Of course, none of the secondary liability tests deal with the
question of whether a defendant can easily remove infringing material or
disable access to infringing material. They do not even deal particularly
well with the degree of notice required by the plaintiff. Even in cases
where the defendant does have sufficient notice of infringement and can
technically act to prevent it, the courts and statutes do not take into
account the costs and benefits inherent in doing so. It may be that the
costs associated with both defending secondary infringement actions and
taking technical steps to combat direct infringements by third parties will
chill innovation in new technologies, such as search engines, online
payment systems, advanced peer-to-peer file sharing services, and
whatever comes next. The following discussion considers whether we
have in fact moved past a time when we should be fragmenting
secondary liability doctrine and applying it in its various new guises in
these online contexts, or whether we should go back to underlying
copyright policy and reconsider it more fully with respect to new online
business models.
III. SECONDARY LIABILITY AND DIGITAL COPYRIGHT POLICY

The nature of online activity has changed dramatically since the
end of the 20th century when digital copyright holders first started
lobbying Congress and the courts to protect existing business models.
We are now moving into an era of Internet activity that has often been
referred to as Web 2.0.56 This new Internet is distinguished from what
came before because it is a distributed, interactive, peer-based
technology, as opposed to a forum for dissemination of information to
passive recipients.57 Commentators on Internet business models are

56. Wikpedia currently defines "Web 2.0" in the following terms:
Web 2.0 is a term describing changing trends in the use of World Wide Web technology
and web design that aims to enhance creativity, secure information sharing, collaboration
and functionality of the web. Web 2.0 concepts have led to the development and
evolution of web-based communities and its hosted services, such as social-networking
sites, video sharing sites, wikis, blogs, and folksonomies.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0 (last visited October 31, 2008).
57. See generally DON TAPScOTr & ANTHONY WILLIAMS, W[KINOMICS: How MASS
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING, 37-39 (2006) (current, thriving Internet services made up
of interactive, peer-based components and mass collaborations); CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES
EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS, 109-12 (2008) (a prime

example of distributed collaboration).
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increasingly arguing that old business models are now dead,5 8 and that,
to be successful, businesses must find ways of embracing the new, more
interactive Internet59 - an Internet built on shared resources and trust
between customers and corporate concerns 60 - rather than the use of
proprietary laws and technologies to protect the value of businesses. 61 In
fact, it has been suggested that today's customers62 demand that
businesses rethink notions of intellectual property online.
With respect to the digital music industry in particular, Tapscott
and Williams have suggested that: "[t]oday the music industry finds
itself launching one expensive lawsuit after another against Internet
music companies, and even against its own customers. Many labels are
desperately struggling to prop up the old way of doing business while
straining to figure out the new." 63 Obviously, these authors were not
specifically addressing doctrines of secondary liability for copyright
infringement here. However, the increasing fragmentation of secondary
liability doctrine in copyright law is arguably part of this larger picture.
This is the picture of an industry becoming increasingly out of touch
with the realities of the new marketplace, clinging to old business
models, and relying on old - but increasingly unsuitable - legal principles
to protect it. It may be that the problems with contributory liability in
the digital copyright world are simply a symptom of the decreasing
suitability of copyright law in general to deal with digital business
models involving creative content.
Consider Perfect 10, for example. Perfect 10 can sue whomever it
wants, but it will never truly manage to protect the business model that it
desires: that is, full or predominant control over all its copyright images
58. TAPSCOTr & WILLIAMS, supra note 57, at 38 ("The immutable, standalone website is
dead.").
59. Id at 39 ("The losers launched Web sites. The winners launched vibrant communities.
The losers built walled gardens. The winners built public squares. The losers innovated internally.
The winners innovated with their users. The losers jealously guarded their data and software
interfaces. The winners shared them with everyone.").
60. Id,at 43 ("For today's new Web companies, building trust is the alternative to controlling
customers.").
61. Id at 53 ("Smart companies ...won't send out cease-and-desist letters; they will find
creative ways to engage N-Geners in the product development and distribution process.").
62. Id at 52
File sharing now accounts for half of the world's Internet traffic - much to the chagrin of
Hollywood - signaling that the Net Generation is renegotiating the definitions of
copyright and intellectual property. Indeed, N-Geners are not only creating new art
forms, they're helping to engender a new creative and philosophical openness. The
ability to remix media, hack products, or otherwise tamper with consumer culture is their
birthright, and they won't let outmoded intellectual property laws stand in their way.
63. Id.
at 58.
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online against any unauthorized copying and distribution. Today, it is
simply too easy to copy and distribute digital images globally at the push
of a button. Ultimately, courts and legislatures will have to recognize
the fact that the existing business model, lucrative as it may have been
for content providers in the physical world, simply cannot survive Web
2.0, even if it appeared to withstand the initial challenges posed by Web
1.0.64
However, in the meantime, much damage can be done to the digital
economy, and much innovation may be chilled in online services
generally if secondary liability continues to fragment, and therefore
effectively to expand in scope. Innovative developments in search
engine technology, payment systems methodology, and probably many
other areas of online activity could be stifled if anyone transacting in any
way on the Internet is potentially liable for secondary copyright
infringement because their activities incidentally brush up against some
direct infringement. The duration and costs of litigation will also
increase as lawyers are forced to argue more and more heads of
secondary liability, in more and more jurisdictions.
Is it possible to come up with a secondary liability test that avoids
these problems? Is there some clear rule we might employ to distinguish
those defendants who truly are complicit in the infringements of third
parties from those who are only incidentally touching on those
infringements? Probably not. In Grokster, the inducement idea looked
promising, but it has now effectively been extended or garbled in Google
to capture those whose business models are not aimed in any significant
way at encouraging or facilitating copyright infringements. Now,
innovators like Google have to expend resources defending these actions
as well as potentially being ordered to re-work their search engines to
counter direct copyright infringement. Further, if secondary liability
doctrines ever do extend to areas such as payment systems, we may see a
really significant stifling of electronic commerce activity. Without
current payment systems provided through services such as Visa and
Mastercard, we may need to revert to the convoluted encrypted email

64. The Wikipedia definition of Web 1.0 contrasts it with Web 2.0 and cites the following
authority:
Terry Flew, in his 3rd Edition of New Media described what he believed to characterize
the differences between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0: 'move from personal websites to blogs
and blog site aggregation, from publishing to participation, from web content as the
outcome of large up-front investment to an ongoing and interactive process, and from
content management systems to links based on tagging (folksonomy)'
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_1.0 (last visited October 31,2008).
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formats for online payments that were initially contemplated at the dawn
of the electronic commerce age.65
Even peer-to-peer file sharing has suffered some unfortunate blows
to innovation. Surely much early peer-to-peer file sharing was utilized
for illegal downloading of copyrighted music. However, there are many
other uses for these technologies that are not copyright infringing. Who
knows if the Napster model was the technologically optimal model for
legal file sharing, or if the newer versions such as Grokster and
BitTorrent are technologically better? They are certainly better at hiding
shared content from copyright holders, but are they more efficient in
practice, or did secondary copyright liability litigation chill innovation in
the file sharing industry back in Napster's day? In other words, is
secondary copyright liability chilling, or skewing, innovation in filesharing technologies so that developers now focus on avoiding copyright
litigation rather than on creating the most efficient file sharing
methodologies? Might the same fate befall other online industries, such
as search engines and payment systems?
Is it time now for copyright holders to focus on new business
models that might emphasize proprietary interests in intellectual
property less, and perhaps play up relationships of trust and confidence
with their customers? If, for example, the online music and video
industries opened up more of a discussion with their customers to find
out what services customers wanted, and what prices they were prepared
to pay, and how customers may contribute to the enterprise overall, they
may be more successful financially. If customers agree to certain
services at a reasonable price, they may be more prepared to blow the
whistle on those cheating the system; that is, if they feel they are on the
same team as the music providers, and are not in an adversarial
relationship with them.
Additionally, if content industries are not providing, say, digitized
copies of older music or movies, and fans choose to create such copies
on their own, could they work in concert with recording and movie
studios for a form of profit sharing in relation to releasing the digital
copies online in a cooperative way? This may not be as far-fetched as it
sounds. Recent experiments in both profit and non-profit industries are
replete with examples of successful collaborative enterprises of this

65. A useful history of early online payments systems can be found in the Wikipedia
definition of "electronic commerce."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electroniccommerce (last
visited October 31, 2008).
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kind.66 If content industries started to more seriously explore these new
kinds of business models there would arguably be less pressure on the
existing copyright system to accommodate them. There would certainly
be less pressure on the older secondary liability doctrines to fragment
into pieces to cope with each new development in online technology that
might incidentally unearth an illegal copy of a photograph or song.
IV. CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that the existing law of secondary liability,
particularly contributory liability in copyright law, has become
fragmented as courts try to keep pace with technological developments
that are not aimed at facilitating infringement. The continued mutation
of the secondary liability doctrine online threatens to chill important
innovations in technology on a global scale. When these concerns about
chilling innovation are coupled with realities of the digital marketplace
and the move to new online business models, we can see that reliance by
copyright holders on both old business models and old laws is not
appropriate. Secondary liability for copyright infringement is but one
example where focusing on the past is potentially impeding the future of
technological innovation.

66. Supra note 57.
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